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Act 92 of 1996, the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act,1 
seems to be justified mainly by recourse to the promotion 
of female reproductive rights and personal autonomy, the 
woman’s ‘right to choose whether to have an early, safe and 
legal termination of pregnancy according to her individual 
beliefs’. The legislator argues that the State has a consequent 
duty to provide ‘safe conditions under which the right of 
choice can be exercised without fear or harm’, and states that 
the ‘decision to have children is fundamental’ to global female 
health.
   The promotion of female autonomy is laudable in a society 
where women’s rights and freedoms are not always duly 
recognised and respected, and where, according to many, 
patriarchy and paternalism often persist.2 However, the Act 
is problematic in denying the responsibility and complicity 
of the male in reproduction. This might be understandable 
since the promotion of autonomy aims to liberate women 
from male domination. The Act does not make any reference 
to the moral stature of the abortus.  The view that the moral 
status of the fetus is insignificant is powerfully supported 
by the utilitarian view on the moral value of prenatal life. 
Utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism, an influential 
moral theory which advocates that moral acts should be judged 
only on results. Utilitarians seek the promotion of happiness, 
or in a contemporary reading, that which produces the best 
results, and argue that the moral significance of all beings 
resides in non-potential acquired characteristics. Membership of 
the human species by itself presents no particular significance; 
speciesism is an unwarranted and unfounded prejudicial 
theory and practice, in terms of which membership of ‘my’ 
species accords us with special moral rights and privileges, 
primarily because we have the power to do so.3 Nor does the 
potential to develop these acquired characteristics warrant moral 
significance.
   The utilitarian characteristics are, firstly, sentientism (the 
ability to suffer, or awareness), based on the supposition that 
the moral domain is demarcated by the capacity for suffering: ‘… 
the question is not, Can they reason? Nor, Can they talk? But, 
Can they suffer?’4 But most animals, certainly most vertebrates, 
are also sentient, and all sentient beings are entitled to equal 
treatment. Utilitarians deny that sentience justifies a ‘right to 
life’, but the ability to suffer is the entrance requirement for any 
conception of moral significance; until such time as sentience is 
present in prenatal life, ‘abortion … terminates an existence 
that is of no intrinsic value at all’.5 The only moral demand a 
sentient being can make is that it not be subjected to suffering.
   The second, and for the utilitarian, more significant acquired 
characteristic is that of rationally defined personhood. Life, for 
utilitarians like Peter Singer,5 John Harris6 and Michael Tooley,7 
has value only because it is the life of a person. A person is 
someone who has attained a sufficient level of self-awareness 
to have developed an interest in the continuance of his or her 
own existence.6 Psychological characteristics like self-awareness 
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Act 92 of 1996, the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act, 
seeks to promote female autonomy. The Act makes no reference 
to the nature of the abortus – implying its moral insignificance. 
Utilitarian arguments on the value of life strongly support this 
position. Utilitarians argue that neither belonging to the human 
species, nor possession of the potential to develop into a person, 
is a significant intrinsic characteristic in determining the value 
of life. For them the entrance requirement to any conception of 
moral significance is sentience – the ability to suffer. Full moral 
significance is only accorded to ‘persons’. A person is someone 
who has attained a sufficient level of self-awareness to have an 
interest in the continuance of its existence. This develops some 
time after birth.
   ‘Conservatives’ argue for conception as the moral cut-off 
point after which termination is morally unacceptable; ‘liberals’ 
hold that there is no such prenatal point. Both of these notions 
are problematic, as is the notion of sentience.
   We argue that separation-survivability is the only morally 
acceptable cut-off point, based on four premises, viz. (i) a 
particular notion of potentiality; (ii) the inextricable, mutual 
relationship between human beings and their world (without 
either, the other cannot exist); (iii) the moral correspondence 
of the viable fetus and the neonate; and (iv) the moral 
unacceptability of infanticide.
   We support a graded position on the value of prenatal 
human life, and a ‘moderate’ stance on termination – that 
notwithstanding possessing some moral significance, other 
arguments may trump this up to the point of separation-
survivability. This seriously problematises ‘partial birth’ 
abortion, and the utilitarian argument on the value of life. 
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and the ability to project oneself into the future, or at least 
some form of the concept of a ‘continuing mental substance’, are 
required before an interest in continued existence (a future) 
can develop, and a living being can ‘value her own life’ – some 
time after birth.7 The fetus clearly does not have this ability yet. 
Killing it does not remove a capacity it has ever experienced; 
it is unaware of what has occurred. Significantly, ‘birth does 
not mark a morally significant dividing line. I cannot see 
how … fetuses may be “replaced” before birth, but newborn 
infants may not be.’5 ‘Replacement’ is the substitution of a 
present being by a later sibling, morally acceptable in classical 
utilitarianism, as long as net happiness is not diminished. 
Thus, Peter Singer distinguishes between persons who have 
a personal preference in their future, and non-persons, who 
cannot have such capacity. Persons are ‘non-replaceable’.
   The utilitarian therefore argues that the prenatal human 
being, the neonate and the infant have negligible moral value 
and do not warrant meaningful consideration for their own sake. 
They may warrant indirect consideration only inasmuch as they 
contribute to or detract from the utility (net benefit, advantage, good 
or bad) of others. It is clear how this position supports Act 92. 
The question is whether this position is morally defensible. We 
think not.
Moral cut-off points
A difficulty that both liberal (‘pro-choice’) and conservative 
(‘pro-life’) positions share in the abortion debate is that of 
moral cut-off points – clearly recognisable, generally accepted 
developmental phases or stages, beyond which the killing of 
a fetus is morally unjustifiable. ‘Conservatives’ often regard 
conception as the moral cut-off point. Of course conception is 
a significant event. The problem here is divisibility.8-10 Some 
pre-embryos may subdivide to bring about the existence of 
two or more identical new beings.9 All cells resulting from the 
earliest divisions are pluri-potentional – each has the ability 
to individuate into a unique individual, should it split off. 
Some subdivisions may subsequently reunite to form a single 
new being (a chimera). If the conservative ascribes full moral 
significance to the fertilised egg, the problem is to conceptualise 
the moral significance of these ‘interim’ beings, and the moral 
nature of the chimera. According full moral significance to 
‘biological’ human life precludes termination for whatever 
indication and problematises the treatment of terminal and 
non-salvageable patients. Conception cannot be the moral cut-
off point.
   Much is made of sentience as a moral cut-off point, since 
this indicates the beginning of ‘awareness’. But the advent 
of sentience is notoriously difficult to quantify. The range of 
suggestions – often little less than thumb suck – vary from 
7 to 30 weeks or more.8,11-13 Recent work has highlighted 
the difficulty of trying to ascertain the psychological (and 
moral) meaning of sentience for the fetus.11-13 Even if there are 
apparently ‘sophisticated and localized behavioural response 
to noxious stimuli’,11,12 it remains impossible to determine the 
nature of the experiential world of the fetus. How might its 
apparent experience of pain – if that is what it experiences 
– affect its future, especially as we have no understanding of its 
memory? We can argue, surmise and infer – with little certainty. 
We are on shaky ground if we rest our case on sentience.14
   If the conservative does not accept conception as the moral 
cut-off point, she justifies early termination, and takes a step 
onto an irresistible slope, since fetal development progresses 
on a continuum without halts or breaks, or obvious morally 
significant demarcation. The conservative is obliged to take the 
‘safest’ option, i.e. conception as cut-off point, notwithstanding 
its inconsistencies, and the attending difficulty in justifying 
any indication for termination. The utilitarian ‘liberal’, on the 
other hand, wants free access to abortion, and chooses a cut-off 
point that allows that, and is, in a sense, irrelevant to the debate 
– personhood appears only some time (utilitarians present no 
time frame) after birth. But the price for this position is the 
difficulty of denying the legitimacy of infanticide, as conceded 
for instance by Peter Singer and Michael Tooley.5,7
The relevance of species membership 
and potential
The inherent potential of the fetus to become a person cannot 
be denied as readily as the utilitarian suggests. We hold strong 
intuitions about the value of (particularly flourishing) human 
life, or at least life that has the potential to flourish later when 
adequate development has taken place, as is the case with 
immature beings. Given a favourable maternal environment, 
the normal embryo may have the full potential to develop into 
a person with a flourishing life, a person with moral attributes, 
and it should not lightly be denied the opportunity to do so 
when both of these requirements are fully present.
   Contrary to utilitarians, existential phenomenologists argue 
that human life has particular significance in a way that 
seriously undermines the utilitarian critique of speciesism. 
The supporting argument is not specifically moral, but also 
philosophical. According to phenomenologists, the world as we 
know it is by definition a human world since it is the correlate 
of the act of making sense by humans. (Wo)man and world 
is a unity of mutual implication. There is a world only because 
there are humans for whom that world has meaning; similarly, there 
are humans only in as much as there is a world that constitutes the 
necessary environment in which they reside. All meaning that 
we can be aware of is of necessity human; we know no other 
world than the world that makes sense to humans. Speciesism 
is therefore not a sign of moral arrogance; it is a necessary 
characteristic of our existence. ‘Man is the sole creator of 
meaning and value in the world’.15,16 Conceptions of value can 
therefore only make sense with reference to humankind and 
therefore presuppose human existence, and consequently any 
prospect of eventual morality as well. There is no alternative 
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way of constituting the world, as we know it; human 
speciesism is not only justifiable and desirable, it is inevitable.
   These are but two arguments one can develop against the 
utilitarian proposal that pre-sentient human life has no inherent 
significance.15-17 Many authors extol the theoretical incoherence 
of utilitarianism (its insistence on utility and denial of the moral 
significance of individual rights, promises and obligations), 
and the societal risks if its arguments are fully deployed (e.g. 
to legitimise infanticide).18 Unlike the utilitarian, based on 
arguments such as these we hold that the humanity of the 
normal embryo has some moral significance from individuation 
onwards – if it has the inherent potential to become a person 
and that potential is accompanied by a definite decision to 
carry it to term. Moral significance increases on a sliding scale 
as development progresses, as more potential is actuated and 
less remains in doubt. Unlike the conservative, our notion 
is not absolute; although abortion is prima facie wrong, it is 
not absolutely or always wrong. Arguments in favour of 
termination may trump the initial limited moral value of the 
embryo/fetus. As development progresses these arguments 
become more persuasive. The question is whether we reach a 
point where termination becomes morally unjustifiable.
Separation-survivability as a moral cut-
off point
We propose that the advent of separation-survivability, or 
viability, is a realistic moral cut-off point.17 We accept current 
clinical consensus that suggests a cut-off point for aggressive 
neonatal intervention at 25 weeks, provided birth mass exceeds 
500 g and in the absence of unmanageable birth defects, 
although the exact gestational age is immaterial to a discussion 
of its philosophical-ethical implications. At about 25 weeks’ 
gestation development reaches the stage where the pre-person 
can survive separation from its mother, should it be born alive 
at that point. This crucial milestone radically alters pre-personal 
moral significance and confirms pre-personal potentiality. It 
is a unique characteristic; the pre-person is now comparable 
to the neonate or an infant – it can survive separation from its 
mother and become an infant (and eventually, a person). We 
perceive the viable fetus as an individual, separate from and 
independent of its mother, capable of attaining legal status and 
of confirming its moral status – the advent of its unique human 
individuality. A human being that can survive on its own has 
every right not to be killed. As with all infants and neonates, 
further growth and development has to, and normally will take 
place; its immaturity alone cannot deny its moral significance. 
We might formerly have conceived of mother and fetus as an 
integrated unit, of the fetus as an anatomical extension of the 
maternal body, like an arm or a leg, ‘flesh of her flesh, part of 
her’ (approximating the legal conception of a pre-person).19 Or 
that the association between female and fetus is relational, a 
relation that the female is entitled to stop at any time since that 
fetus can have no relation with any other body. 
   But now no more; we are obliged to accept that the fetus is 
not dependent on, or locked into this particular physical or 
emotional relation. It has acquired the potential to enter into 
other relations, as it gradually becomes more of a subject.20 
It need not remain bound to this maternal figure. It remains 
vulnerable and dependent on human care and protection. 
Since all neonates, infants and toddlers are vulnerable and 
dependent, this should not exclusively negate the moral 
significance of the viable fetus.
   The moral correspondence between the normal neonate 
and the normal viable fetus in the last weeks of pregnancy 
justifies equal treatment. We argue that the process of birth, 
though the final episode in the pre-natal development of the 
fetus, is of limited and secondary philosophical and moral 
importance.18,21-25 We do not kill neonates; neither should we 
kill the viable fetus. Of course, we assume that infanticide is 
morally unjustifiable and incompatible with responsible societal 
life. Our most basic moral intuitions abhor infanticide and 
direct us to protect (normal) neonates and infants because of 
their humanity, potentiality and vulnerability. If infanticide is 
morally unacceptable, so too is feticide (the killing of normal, 
viable fetuses), unless, of course they are killed because of 
termination for which there are compelling reasons, such as a 
threat to the life or health of the pregnant woman. But we are 
not obliged to act in defence of the fetus against the wishes of 
the mother (enforcing caesarean section, incarceration to quell 
substance abuse, postmortem caesarean section, etc.).
   Therefore, separation-viability may be the elusive moral cut-off 
point to justify a claim to a ‘right to life’. It is the only realistic 
and justifiable moral cut-off point; conception, or individuation, 
and sentience are insufficient, and psychological personhood 
appears too late to be useful. Viability as a moral cut-off point 
provides firm argumentative ground in the abortion standoff. 
Since infanticide is prima facie wrong, and there is no moral 
difference between the viable fetus and the neonate, we have a 
moral obligation to treat them equally; both should be accorded 
the opportunity to actuate their inherent potential. They should 
not be terminated. These reasoned grounds should change our 
approach to the termination of pregnancy beyond the advent of 
viability. Viable pre-persons have a ‘right to (the continuation 
of their) life’ claim (or should at least be conferred the benefit 
of societal protection, if a ‘right to life’ is too presumptuous a 
claim). Reasons to allow termination beyond this point should 
be very persuasive since they are set up against a powerful 
argument.
   Should this right or benefit be trumped by the autonomy of 
the woman as the only legitimate spokesperson for the viable 
fetus? Not necessarily. One reason is the consequence of the 
utilitarian argument. If there is little difference between the 
viable fetus and the baby it has the imminent potential to 
become, as the utilitarians and we agree, and we may kill the 
fetus, what moral reason stops us from killing the baby, as 
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Singer suggests,5 if the mother so wants? There is no direct, 
or even indirect, moral reason that does not also apply to the 
viable fetus.
   This discussion underlines the relation between scientific 
knowledge and philosophical discussion; scientific knowledge 
is a particular prerequisite to sensible biomedical reflection. 
Technological advances increasingly factor in the survival of 
premature neonates. We should not confuse moral significance 
with the availability of sophisticated treatment. This is not a 
plea for the aggressive treatment of 25-week neonates, only that 
since they are (at least theoretically) viable, this precludes their 
termination while still in utero.
   We conclude with three final comments. If our argument is 
correct, ‘partial birth’ abortion (killing of the fetus just before 
it is born, usually at the crowning of the head), legal in Israel 
and only recently totally outlawed in all of the USA, is seriously 
problematised.
   The utilitarian linkage of fetal and neonatal moral significance 
problematises their personhood argument. Utilitarians who 
hold a liberal view on abortion are obliged to accommodate 
infanticide, without which their argument is inconsistent.
   Our position supports a moderate stand on abortion and gives 
moral support to the protection of third-term fetuses, as such 
also supporting generally held moral intuitions. ‘Moderate’ 
here means a position that is neither absolutely pro-choice, nor 
absolutely pro-life, but somewhere in between.17 The moderate 
position argues that even if there might be moral significance 
at conception, or individuation, this can be overridden by 
other contextual considerations and arguments. Moral value 
develops in line with fetal development throughout pregnancy, 
and a critical moral cut-off point may even be reached 
sometime during pregnancy, beyond which the termination of 
pregnancy is precluded. We argue that this point is separation-
survivability.
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